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Abstract: 
Syntactic theory has traditionally adopted a constructivist approach, in which a set of atomic elements 
are manipulated by combinatory operations to yield derived, complex elements. Syntactic structure is 
thus seen as the result or discrete recursive combinatorics over lexical items which get assembled into 
phrases, which are themselves combined to form sentences. This view is common to European and 
American structuralism (e.g., Benveniste, 1971; Hockett, 1958) and different incarnations of 
generative grammar, transformational and non-transformational (Chomsky, 1956, 1995; and Kaplan 
& Bresnan, 1982; Gazdar, 1982). Since at least Uriagereka (2002), there has been some attention paid 
to the fact that syntactic operations must apply somewhere, particularly when copying and movement 
operations are considered. Contemporary syntactic theory has thus somewhat acknowledged the 
importance of formalizing aspects of the spaces in which elements are manipulated, but it is still a 
vastly underexplored area. In this paper we explore the consequences of conceptualizing ‘syntax’ as a 
set of topological operations applying over spaces rather than over discrete elements. We argue that 
there are empirical advantages in such a view for the treatment of long-distance dependencies and 
cross-derivational dependencies: constraints on possible configurations emerge from the dynamics of 
the system.  
Keywords: Syntax; topology; knots; workspace; phrase markers 
1. Introduction: 
Phrase markers, or structural descriptions for natural language sentences, are usually 
conceived of as sets: transition rules (as in classical formal language theory; Hopcroft & Ullman, 
1969; Chomsky, 1957) or stepwise discrete combinatorics (the Minimalist Program’s Merge; 
Chomsky, 1995 and much subsequent work) produce sets of terminal and non-terminal elements (in 
linguistic terms, these are usually identified as lexical items and phrasal nodes, respectively). In 
transformational generative grammar, a recurrent topic has been the need to hold on to structure, 
either because it needs to be kept within probing memory for further operations (think of the relation 
between a pronominal or anaphoric form and its antecedent) or because it has been subject to a 
reordering rule (operator-variable relations); not to mention the generalized transformations 
adjunction and substitution, which relate parallel derivations. All these scenarios imply that chunks of 
structure are stored somewhere, where they can be accessed and where rules of the grammar can 
relate initially distinct and separate derivations. The purpose of this paper is to make explicit exactly 
what thinking about workspaces commits us to formally, and how we can make use of mathematically 
explicit characterizations of spaces to our advantage in syntactic theory. Our main area of interest, 
then, will be the interaction between syntax and topology.  
Viewing phrase markers as topological objects is not necessarily a new idea: already Bach 
(1964: 71) formulates conditions on phrase markers (P-markers) in terms of their ‘topological’ [sic] 
properties: 
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A proper P marker (when represented in tree form) is a topological structure of lines and 
nodes conforming to the general requirement that a unique path be traceable from the 
termination of every branch to the point of origin of the whole tree (or for that matter from 
any node to any other node) (our highlighting) 
This perspective allowed for the formalization of conditions over structural descriptions in graph-
theoretic terms (e.g., Zwicky & Isard, 1967; McCawley, 1968a; Morin & O’Miley, 1969; Kuroda, 
1976; also Arc Pair Grammar; Johnson & Postal, 1980 and its spiritual successor, Metagraph 
Grammar; Postal, 2010. More orthodox generative analyses are to be found, e.g., in Kracht, 2001; 
Beim Graben & Gerth, 2012). In these works, operations apply to nodes, creating or deleting edges, in 
order to establish syntactic dependencies. Let us see a simple example. Assume that we have a phrase 
marker in which objects X and Y are in a local relation, as represented in (1): 
1)  
 
 
Now suppose that there is some relation R between X and Y: for instance, say X theta-marks Y. That 
relation needs to be maintained throughout the derivation, or reconstructed at the level of semantic 
interpretation if disrupted by a reordering or deletion rule. We have seen some problems with the 
latter option, so we would like to give some general prospects to explore the former. Let us now 
introduce a further element in the derivation, W, which requires a local relation with Y in order to 
satisfy some requirement (which one in particular is not relevant for the present argument). W is 
external to {X, Y}, following a cumulative approach to derivational dynamics (which Chomsky, 
1995: 190 encodes in the so-called Extension Condition1): 
2)  
 
 
 
But, what happens if a local configuration between W and Y is required (because, for instance, Y 
satisfies a criterial feature on W), and such relation cannot hold if X is in between? A displacement-
as-movement approach can either (a) move Y to a higher position in the checking domain of W 
(extending U), outside the scope of X leaving a co-indexed trace behind (the so-called trace theory), 
or (b) copy Y and re-introduce Y in the derivation (the so-called Copy Theory of Movement CTM, or 
Copy+Re-Merge theory; Chomsky, 2000; Uriagereka, 2002; Nunes, 2004; Johnson, 2016 and much 
related work). Both options are diagrammed below: 
 
                                                          
1 Formulated as follows: 
Suppose we restrict substitution operations still further, requiring that Ø be external to the targeted 
phrase marker K. Thus, GT and Move-α extend K to K*, which includes K as a proper part (Chomsky, 
1995: 190). 
X Y 
Z 
X Y 
Z W 
U 
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3)  
 
 
 
 
In both cases, the structure is extended by means of extra nodes: in (a), we add a trace of Y, an index 
to Y and t, and expand U; in (b) we add a copy of Y and similarly expand U. In both cases, there is a 
local relation between W and Y, as required (because there is no other head between these two nodes), 
but at the cost of introducing inaudible structure. Moreover, the very idea of copying requires not only 
an operation that takes Y and somehow yields another Y, but this has to happen somewhere: an 
explicit workout of the concept of workspace seems to be unavoidable, yet there is no explicit 
characterization of what workspaces are and how they interact with the generative procedure in 
mainstream Minimalism. To give a recent example, Chomsky et al. (2017) explicitly say that 
MERGE operates over syntactic objects placed in a workspace: the MERGE-mates X and Y are 
either taken from the lexicon or were assembled previously within the same workspace 
In this context, the lack of specific accounts of the properties of the workspace where operations are 
supposed to apply is rather surprising. Not least because the properties of the workspace may impose 
hard conditions on the operations that can apply; if syntactic operations apply to objects in a space, 
those objects need to be characterized as array of components in that space; in turn this has deep 
consequences for an account of dependencies between objects (see Section 5): the very notions of 
local and non-local dependency need to be reconceptualised.  
The mention of a workspace in the formulation of the structure building operation (External 
Merge) is in some sense a novelty, but it has been around (more or less explicitly) in several 
Minimalist accounts of structure mapping (i.e., Move / Internal Merge): ‘moving’ a syntactic object 
has been looked at in terms of Copy + Re-Merge of that object (see Chomsky, 2000; Nunes, 2004; 
Johnson, 2016 for a variety of perspectives). But the Copy-based approach has some fundamental 
problems, pertaining to the lack of explicitness about the specific mechanism involved in Copying. 
Stroik & Putnam (2013: 20) formulate the issue very clearly:  
To “copy X” is not merely a single act of making a facsimile. It is actually a complex three-part 
act: it involves (i) making a facsimile of X, (ii) leaving X in its original domain D1, and (iii) 
placing the facsimile in a new domain D2. So, to make a copy of a painting, one must 
reproduce the painting somewhere (on a canvas, on film, etc.), and to make a copy of a 
computer file, one must reproduce the file somewhere in the computer (at least in temporary 
memory). (highlighting ours) 
But this problem, the lack of attention to where syntactic operations apply (i.e., the lack of a 
systematic analysis of syntactic workspaces and the way in which they interact with, affect, or 
constrain operations), is not exclusive to the Minimalist copy theory of movement or the revival of 
Generalized Transformations in the original definition of Merge (see fn. 1). Consider Fiengo’s (1977: 
44-45) decomposition of the rule Move-NP within the framework of the trace theory (which was 
replaced by the copy theory in Minimalism; see Chomsky, 2000 for some discussion): 
X ti 
Z W 
U 
(a) 
Yi 
U 
X Y 
Z W 
U 
(b) 
Y 
U 
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…movement of NPi to position NPj (where A and B are the contents of these nodes) in (30) 
yields (31) as a derived constituent structure.  
(30) … NPj … NPi … 
               |           | 
              A         B  
(31) … NPi … NPi … 
               |           | 
              B          e  
On this view, NPi and its contents are copied at position NPj, deleting NPj and A, and the 
identity element e is inserted as the contents of (in this case the righthand) NPi, deleting B 
under identity. 
Note that, once again, we need to copy NPi at B and store it somewhere for a derivational step2, before 
inserting it at A. It is important to point out that the problem of specifying where operations take place 
arises both in the case of External and Internal Merge (which, as Stroik & Putnam, 2013: 21 point out, 
can be rethought within a Copy-only system in which differences are determined by the source and the 
goal of the Copy operation: this reworking of IM and EM, unlike the orthodox Chomskyan version, 
makes it explicit that IM and EM differ in terms of the spaces that get accessed in each case and how 
the target syntactic object is affected –whether the space gets extended or not-; see also Stroik, 2009 
and Putnam & Stroik, 2010). The former is actually more complex than the latter, in some (informal) 
sense, as it involves a relation between two spaces, and possibly a further operation of selection such 
that only some elements of the Lexicon are used in a given derivation (e.g., Chomsky, 2000: 101; see 
also Chomsky, 2012: 3). This is a direct and unavoidable (as far as we can see) consequence of 
dissociating lexicon from syntax and these two from the ‘interfaces’. It is interesting to note that the 
operation Transfer, which takes syntactic domains and sends them to the interfaces, has been looked 
at from the perspective of what gets transferred (Chomsky, 2001; 2004; 2013; 2015); this is a crucial 
aspect of phase theory. Deciding which the phase heads are (only C, v? Also T, varying 
parametrically (e.g., Gallego, 2010)? Maybe D (Chomsky, 2000)?) and whether it is the complement 
of the phase head or the full phase that gets transferred (Epstein et al., 2015) have been rather major 
questions in the Minimalist agenda. However, little if anything has been said about where these 
syntactic objects are transferred from and whether the space to which they are transferred has the 
same properties as the source. In other words: are the interfaces isomorphic to the syntactic 
workspace? If so, why and how? If not, why not and in which ways? One way to think about this is in 
terms of multiple-tape automata and multiple stacks instantiating memory buffers (see Uriagereka, 
2014, 2018 for some discussion that seems to go in this direction). In such a view, workspaces are 
tapes in a traditional automata-theoretic sense (Turing, 1936; Hopcroft & Ullman, 1969), and 
syntactic computation proceeds by transitioning between states until the computation halts because 
the input tape does not satisfy the structural description for any rule. We will not review the extensive 
                                                          
2 It is worth remembering at this point that the computational system in generative grammar, from the early days 
of LSLT and the Standard Theory to contemporary models, is an example of the so-called Von Neumann 
architecture (Von Neumann, 1945). In this architecture, which is implemented by Turing Machines, at any given 
time only a single agent in the computational architecture could be active. This condition translates to an 
inherent sequentiality of computation. Consider, for instance, that in rewriting rules, the ‘Traffic Convention’ 
ensures that rewriting applies from left to right, one symbol at a time. Thus, in a sequence XYZ, where X, Y, 
and Z are intermediate, or ‘nonterminal’, symbols, a rule rewriting X must apply before a rule rewriting Y. In 
the case in which we have XY, however, rewriting either first results in equivalent derivations, at least formally. 
See Chomsky (1956: 117) for some discussion.     
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literature on formal language theory or its applications to natural language grammar, but it is worth 
noting that a strongly derivational system based around the notion of cycle faces certain difficulties 
when mechanically implemented in an automaton. As far as we know, the only fully explicit 
implementation of a derivational system without representations in automaton form is Medeiros’ 
(2018a, b) ULTRA model, which is based on a Context-Free stack-sorting mechanism. The ULTRA 
model is a very robust method to derive legitimate orders within a single derivational space (as can be 
seen in Medeiros’ account of Greenberg’s Universal 20), but its applicability is less straightforward 
when we deal with instances of substitution or adjunction (Joshi, 1985; Frank, 2002). This is so 
because there does not seem to be a clear way to implement dependencies across tapes or sorting 
mechanisms each corresponding to a local workspace. Coincidentally, non-local dependencies are the 
ones that motivated the notion of workspace in syntactic theory to begin with. In this paper we 
address some of the problems and questions that arise when the notion of a workspace is embedded in 
the context of syntactic theory with the purpose of aiding in assigning structural descriptions to 
natural language strings, and propose a way in which thinking about syntactic workspaces in terms of 
topological spaces (rather than stack tapes or other kinds of mechanistic memory buffers) has some 
important empirical and theoretical consequences. 
Here we are primarily concerned with two aspects in the analysis of syntactic dependencies 
involving X, Y, W as in (2): (i) the distance between X and Y and W and Y in the definition of 
syntactic relations, and (ii) the properties of the spaces where these dependencies are defined. These 
concerns are (not so) implicit in the idea of long distance dependencies and discontinuity, a major 
topic in syntactic research (see, e.g., Wells, 1947; Ross, 1967; Postal, 1997; Sag, 2010 for a healthy 
variety of perspectives). In this paper we will not review the transformational answer to the problem 
of discontinuous dependencies; rather, we will focus on a topological interpretation of the notion of 
distance that we can use to shed new light on the problem of syntactic dependencies assuming with 
MGG that operations occur somewhere but departing from MGG in the characterization of the 
operations themselves: their input, their inner workings, and their output. We refer to the framework 
proposed here as a topological view of syntax: a view in which computational operations affect 
(transform) a space rather than combining (Merging, concatenating, etc.) a set of discrete indexed 
nodes. It must be borne in mind, however, that we present a topological view of syntax, not the only 
possible one. The mathematical properties of spaces that we will describe here may be compatible to 
different extents with several versions of MGG including Chomsky’s recent ‘reformulation’ of Merge 
(Chomsky, 2017; Chomsky et al., 2017; see also Epstein et al., 2015). 
2. On the properties of topological spaces: 
In this context, some definitions are in order. First, we need to introduce the concept of 
topological space (see Sutherland, 2009: Chapter 5 for basic notational and terminological points). A 
topological space is defined as a set of points, along with a set of neighbourhoods for each point, 
satisfying a set of axioms relating points and neighbourhoods. Crucially, the specific axioms that each 
kind of space satisfies gives us a classification of spaces, and may open the possibility of having 
functions that take us from one kind of space to another (for technical details, see e.g., Willard, 2004; 
Hazewinkel, 2001; Sakai, 2013). A topological space X is Hausdorff, or T2, or separated, if any two 
distinct points in X are separated by disjoint neighbourhoods. It is completely Hausdorff if any two 
distinct points in X are separated by disjoint closed neighbourhoods. The distinction between closed 
and open neighbourhoods is essential, since bringing points closer together can make their 
neighbourhoods intersect if these are open. Also, for X a topological space and p a point in X, the 
neighbourhood of p is a subset U of X that includes an open set V containing p. In simpler terms, a 
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neighbourhood of p is a set containing the point where one can move that point some amount without 
leaving the set. These notions should resonate with the syntactician, after all, the projection of a head 
H can be characterized as its neighbourhood and edge phenomena also require the definition of an 
appropriate metric with respect to the head of an endocentric structure. Specifically, for instance, 
Chomsky’s (2000, 2001) Phase Impenetrability Condition depends on how much the edge of a 
syntactic object comprises; in other words, what counts as close enough to the phase head to undergo 
Transfer: 
In phase α with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to operations outside α; only H and its 
edge are accessible to such operations (Chomsky, 2000: 108) 
The domain of H [a phase head] is not accessible to operations at ZP [the next phase]; only H and 
its edge are accessible to such operations. (Chomsky, 2001: 14) 
Second-order conditions over operations like Agree (including varieties of Minimality; see e.g., 
Rizzi, 2016) also crucially depend on there being an unambiguous definition of distance between 
points in the space where the phrase marker is defined. Counting number of edges (as in Kayne, 1984) 
requires taking the graph-theoretic view of phrase markers literally (such that structural descriptions 
are sets of vertices connected by edges where dependencies between syntactic objects are defined in 
paths), which in turn undermines its cognitive plausibility (as pointed out by Chomsky himself). This 
view has additional empirical problems, analysed in detail in Krivochen (2018a). But even if the 
reader wanted to maintain the idea of structural descriptions having the format of binary-branching 
trees uniformly, the problem of defining the properties of the spaces where these trees are derived and 
how to establish (or block) cross-derivational relations in a way that does not require introducing 
additional principles but rather follows from fundamental properties of these spaces remains 
unaddressed. 
The idea of incorporating topological insights in the analysis of phrase markers has been taken up 
in recent times. Relevant works which explicitly deal with topological properties of phrase markers 
are Roberts (2015) and Uriagereka (2011), where single-rooted, binary-branching, labelled, oriented 
tree-like structural descriptions are analyzed as mathematical constructs: in their view, phrase markers 
are best understood formally as geometric structures in an ultrametric space. Let us clarify this, 
because while we will challenge the idea that phrase markers are ultrametric, the properties of 
ultrametric spaces will be crucial to our proposal. First and foremost, we need to present the notion of 
metric space. A metric space is a set together with a metric on that set, which specifies the distance 
between members of that set. The distance d over a set X is a function defined on the Cartesian 
product X × X; d will be called a metric iff the following properties hold (Searcóid, 2006; Kaplansky, 
1977; Sutherland, 2009, among many others): 
4) a. d(x, y) > 0 if x ≠ y (positive property) 
b. d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (identity property) 
c. d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetric property) 
d. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality)   
(for all x, y, z, … ∈ ℝ) 
The distance function d(x, y) → |x – y| defined on ℝ × ℝ is called an Euclidean metric on ℝ. 
Distances in Euclidean spaces, except in special cases, are not only real, but also positive (i.e., d(x, y) 
∈ ℕ), and they are not constant: two distinct points x and y can be arbitrarily near or far apart, but 
never have 0 distance (given 4a, b). The triangle inequality also determines that distances in metric 
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spaces sum: informally, if x is m away from y and y is n away from z in a linear graph, then x is m + n 
away from z. This is a crucial property of metric spaces, because it allows us to formulate the notion 
of closeness in comparative terms, such that x is closer to y than z if d(x, y) < d(y, z) (i.e., if m < n). 
What distance is measured in terms of may vary, but its importance cannot be denied for the theory of 
syntax. We can see a very early example of an explicit use of distance in the formulation of a 
transformational rule in Rosenbaum’s (1965: 10) formulation of what later became equi NP deletion: 
A NPj is erased by an identical NPi if and only if there a Sα such that 
i) NPj is dominated by Sα 
ii) NPi neither dominates nor is dominated by Sα 
iii) For all NPk neither dominating nor dominated by Sα the distance between NPj and NPk is 
greater than the distance between NPj and NPi, where the distance between two nodes is 
defined in terms of the number of branches in the path connecting them 
More recently, the anti-symmetric perspective on phrase markers (Kayne, 1984, 1994), which 
strongly advocates for a priori reasons to have uniform binary-branching trees, also makes explicit 
reference to distances between nodes in trees; the heavy use of set-theoretic terminology must not 
obscure the fact that graphs are sets as well (e.g., Wilson, 1996). Kayne’s (1984) take on the Empty 
Category Principle and Chomsky’s (1995) Shortest Move and Minimal Link Condition economy 
principles, to give just two examples, crucially depend on there being a way to determine, given 
syntactic objects X, Y, and Z, whether a ‘minimal’ operation can relate X and Y or X and Z. In other 
versions of the theory, accessibility depended on the presence of bounding nodes; Chomsky (1995: 
§1.4.2) claims that such a proposal is insufficient for some instances of binding relations, and a 
configurational approach based on c-command (which is orthogonal to the presence of bounding 
nodes in a monotonic phrase marker) is to be preferred. Similarly, Kayne (1984: 175) formulates 
accessibility conditions in terms of accessible subtrees, and connections between these: because these 
trees are ordered sets of nodes, they define a metric space. The Minimalist notion of economy of 
derivation seems to require the unambiguous specification of a metric for phrase markers (see also 
Lasnik & Uriagereka, 2005: Chapters 3 and 5 for further discussion about economy of derivation).    
We have characterized metric spaces, now we are ready to define ultrametricity (which we need 
to evaluate the explicitly topological proposals of Roberts and Uriagereka). An ultrametric space (the 
term is due to Krasner, 1944), which is a specific instance of topological space, is a set of points with 
an associated distance function d mapped onto the set of real numbers ℝ such that the following 
conditions hold (Kaplansky, 1977; Artin, 1967): 
5) a) d(x, y) ≥ 0 (positive property) 
b) d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (identity property) 
c) d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetric property) 
d) d(x, z) ≤ max{d(x, y), d(y, z)} (Ultrametric Inequality)  
Relevantly, a topological space is Hausdorff or T2, or separated if, for X a topological space and x and 
y distinct, topologically distinguishable points in X, there exists a neighbourhood U of x and a 
neighbourhood V of y, and (U ∩ V) = {Ø} (this is called the ‘separation axiom’, and the Hausdoff 
characteristic of ultrametric spaces will be very important below). A space is completely Hausdorff if 
any two distinct points in X are separated by disjoint closed neighbourhoods: x and y are separated by 
closed neighborhoods if there exists a closed neighborhood U of x and a closed neighborhood V of y 
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such that U and V are disjoint (U ∩ V = ∅) (Munkres, 2000; Willard, 2004). The separation axiom 
imposes stronger conditions on completely Hausdorff spaces than in Hausdorff spaces, because the 
former specify closed neighbourhoods: this will become crucial in our proposal. Ultrametric spaces 
have interesting topological properties, some of which we summarize here. For instance, only a subset 
of isosceles triangles is allowed (acute isosceles), given the replacement of the triangle inequality that 
holds for metric spaces (in formal terms, d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z), for x, y, and z vertices of a triangle) 
by the ultrametric inequality in (5d). Equilateral triangles are also allowed. Another interesting 
property is that, for every point within a sphere, that point is the center of the sphere (given a constant 
distance function between distinct points), something that can defy our geometrical imagination, 
mostly confined to Euclidean figures and polyhedra. Most importantly, perhaps, is the following 
consequence of the Ultrametric Inequality3: 
e) ||x + y|| = ||x|| 
where || · || is a length function which assigns a number to each element of a group; in this case the 
number pertains to the distance of a point to the origin of coordinates. Note that this means that, in 
ultrametric spaces, distances do not sum.  
The properties of the space where a mathematical construct is defined, then, gives us some hard 
constraints with respect to the properties that can be ascribed to such construct. In our opinion, this is 
the most important and interesting aspect that follows from taking the idea of a workspace for 
syntactic operations seriously: the specific kind of space that we assume is the canvas for syntactic 
operations restricts the class of possible grammars, with purely empirical considerations (‘how to 
provide structural descriptions for natural language strings which do not impose more or less structure 
than needed?’ See Lasnik, 2011; Krivochen, 2015, 2016 for discussion) imposing further restrictions 
and defining the class of adequate grammars (see also Joshi, 1985 on the notion of strong adequacy). 
3. Previous approaches: 
In this section we comment on relevant literature that explicitly deals with topological properties of 
phrase markers and the spaces where they are defined, which will constitute the starting point for our 
own proposal. While there are many remarks in the literature about ‘workspaces’, ‘distance’, and 
related notions, they are more often than not too vague to be evaluated formally; it is possible that 
many of those would turn out to be equivalent to Uriagereka’s or Roberts’ if they were to be made 
mathematically explicit. In the interest of clarity, we will only review these two before presenting our 
reworking of a space-based syntax.  
3.1 Roberts’ (2015) Ultrametric Distances in Syntax 
Roberts (2015) formalizes the X-bar template (comprising the axioms of binary branching, 
projection, and endocentricity, plus the Single Mother Condition) in terms of ultrametric trees, such 
that notions like Complement and Specifier are defined in terms of Merge distance from the head, as 
follows (from Roberts, 2015: 118)4: 
                                                          
3 A simple proof can be found at https://planetmath.org/UltrametricTriangleInequality  
4 Hughes (2004: 149) distinguishes ‘classical trees’ from ‘ℝ trees’: the former allow branching at a discrete set 
of points, whereas the latter allow branching at all points. Formally, ‘A real tree, or ℝ tree, is a metric space (T, 
d) that is uniquely arcwise connected, and for any two points x, y ∈ T the unique arc form from x to y, denoted 
[x, y], is isometric to the subinterval [0, d(x, y)] of ℝ.’ (Hughes, 2004: 152). 
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6)  
 
 
 
 
 
The use of ultrametricity in the analysis of hierarchical trees is not novel; the innovation resides in 
applying the mathematical tools available for ultrametric spaces to the X-bar schema. For instance, 
Rammal et al. (1986) report and analyze the application of this topology in the development on 
taxonomy trees in evolutionary biology; see also Sneath and Sokal (1973) (Roberts, 2015: 111-112 
offers a good review of the use of ultrametricity in modelling varied systems). In ultrametric trees, 
distance functions between elements (nodes) are often expressed as a matrix; when that matrix 
satisfies the requirements of an ultrametric space, ‘it follows that a dendrogram [here, read ‘a tree’] 
can be unambiguously built’ (Rammal et al., 1986: 768). Let us consider one such matrix, where each 
number is an integer added to the distance i between two points (represented in columns and rows). In 
this form, the ultrametric X-bar tree looks like this (taken from Roberts, 2015: 118-119): 
7)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The matrix in (7a) is taken in Roberts (2015) to prove that in the X-bar geometry there are no 
equilateral triangles; this is consistent with the intuition encoded in the X-bar template that the 
relation between a head and its complement is a ‘closer’ one than the relation between a head and its 
specifier(s); here ‘closeness’ is interpreted literally. Roberts (2015: 113) claims that ‘the greater the 
ultrametric distance required the more complex a sentence is’. This complexity metric is itself 
problematic when applied to structural descriptions for natural language sentences (although its 
applicability to abstract mathematical structures is not so): crucially, ultrametric approaches to phrase 
                                                          
Interestingly, it follows from Hughes’ argumentation that considerations of ultrametricity seem to go better with 
ℝ trees than with classical trees. The determination of the points at which branching is allowed for tree-based 
formalisms (like X-bar theory) is problematic, both from a topological and a syntactic point of view: why, if not 
by means of an axiom (e.g., stipulations over the alphabet the system works with), does X’ branch but not X0? 
In the discussion that follows, we will deal with classical trees, which are the object of Uriagereka’s and 
Roberts’ inquiry (although implicitly, since the distinction is never made in those works).  
a) 
b) 
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structure are forced to set the distinction between monotonic and non-monotonic operations aside 
(which of course does not arise in decision trees or taxonomical trees). The ultrametric approach 
seems to be incompatible with a derivational view of structure building. This is an important point for 
a theory of syntax, since some constraints on extraction and more generally the establishment of 
dependencies (for example, the Condition on Extraction Domains –Huang, 1982-; the Subject and 
Adjunct conditions –Ross, 1967; Chomsky, 1973-; the Complex NP Constraint –Ross, 1967-, among 
others; see McCawley, 1998: Chapter 15 for an overview) seem to hinge on whether the syntactic 
object triggering an operation and the target of that operation are contained in a syntactic domain that 
has been monotonically assembled. In a derivational theory like the Minimalist Program, in which 
structure is built in a dedicated syntactic component by means of discrete combinatorics, we need to 
distinguish between operations that extend the phrase marker uniformly introducing a single terminal 
at a time (thus producing a series of structures {head, non-head}; see Chomsky, 2013, 2015; Rizzi, 
2016) and operations which extend the phrase marker by introducing not a terminal, but a complex 
object (itself derived by the combinatoric operation). The first case (illustrated in (8a)) is referred to as 
monotonic Merge because the phrase marker grows uniformly (a single terminal at a time); the second 
(illustrated in (8b)) is referred to as non-monotonic Merge, because although the phrase marker does 
grow at every point, it does not grow uniformly due to the introduction of both terminals and non-
terminals in the derivational space 
8)  
 
 
 
 
Note that in (8a) each step introduces a terminal node into the structure. The segmentation 
corresponding to (8a) is [γ [α [β]]], which can appropriately be assigned to a sentence like [he [saw 
[her]]]. Note, however, that such a segmentation does not work if we are dealing with a complex 
subject, as in *[the [man [saw [her]]]], because it fails to account for the fact that the man is a 
constituent. This is a case in which non-monotonicity comes into play: the tree grows uniformly 
(‘monotonically’), terminal by terminal until the complex subject (which is itself made up of two 
terminals) is introduced: the growth pattern of the structure is disrupted, as suddenly there is more 
structure introduced in a single step than a simple terminal. This non-monotonic operation yields the 
correct segmentation [[the man] [saw her]]. This is just an example, but we hope illustrative enough, 
of the importance of the distinction between monotonic and non-monotonic operations in 
combinatory-based syntax (see Uriagereka, 2002; 2012: Chapters 1, 4 for further discussion).   
In the light of this discussion, let us consider the tree representation Roberts (2015: 119) 
proposes for [the man ate a dog], where there is no distinction between [the man] and [a dog] with 
respect to how or when they are introduced in the phrase marker (i.e., no derivational distinction): 
α β 
γ 
α β 
γ θ δ 
b) 
α α β 
α β 
γ 
a) 
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9)  
 
 
 
 
  
According to Roberts (2015: 119), (9) is ‘the correct tree’ representation for [the man ate a dog], 
because all (intermediate) nodes occur at the lowest possible height. Consider, also, the definitions of 
domination that Roberts assumes: 
i) h(A) is higher up or at the same height on the tree as h(B) i.e. h(A) ≥ h(B) 
ii) it is possible to trace a path from A to B going only downward, or at most going to one 
higher node. (Roberts, 2015: 123) 
While the segmentation assigned to the string is indeed appropriate, there are other difficulties. 
Note that in this system, the asymmetry between subjects and objects cannot be captured (in the terms 
we introduced above, the former are non-monotonically introduced into the phrase marker and 
constitute opaque domains for syntactic operations; the latter are monotonically introduced into the 
phrase marker and are transparent for operations triggered from the outside), because both subjects 
and objects appear at the same height. It is not enough to be able to say that subjects ‘dominate’ 
objects, because the notion of domination is strictly representational, not derivational5.  
GB’s Satisfy (Chomsky, 1981), as well as MP’s Merge (Chomsky, 1995) or the more recent 
simplest Merge or MERGE (Chomsky, 2017; Epstein et al., 2015) yield binary-branching, 
endocentric, projecting structures. In all cases, structural descriptions respect the so-called Single 
Mother Condition (that is, the axiom that every node has at most one node immediately dominating it; 
see Sampson, 1975) in ultrametric representations runs into empirical difficulties even within the 
limits of mainstream transformational generative grammar, which is the framework that Roberts 
adopts. For example, in the structural description assigned to The man is envious of an elephant, 
reproduced here as (10) 
                                                          
5 Epstein (1999) proposes a derivational definition of c-command which could in principle be adopted 
X c-commands all and only the terms of the category Y with which X was paired (by Merge or by Move) 
in the course of the derivation (Epstein, 1999: 329) 
However, since Roberts makes no claims about how his structures are built, this note is little more than 
speculation.  
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10)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the relation between the NP the man and the head that theta-marks it (the A envious) is such that the 
man dominates envious, which in turn requires the introduction of further complications in the theory 
(in this case, allow a theta-marked term to c-command its theta-marker, or add m-command6 to the 
repertoire of legitimate structural relations). All in all, it is not clear what we win, theoretically or 
empirically, by formalizing X-bar theory (with all of its shortcomings) as ultrametric trees. 
It is necessary to point out that Roberts does not deal with so-called non-local dependencies (e.g., 
wh-movement, extrapositions, anaphoric relations), which have motivated most of the literature on 
distance in syntax; it is not clear how effects like Superiority or Minimality (which require distances 
between syntactic objects to vary more subtly than being either at 0 distance or at some fixed d which 
would yield global equidistance) would be captured in a framework where phrase markers are defined 
in ultrametric spaces. No condition on structural dependencies based on relative distance in syntax 
can be formulated in a workspace that is topologically ultrametric. However, this does not mean that 
ultrametric spaces are to be completely discarded: what we argue is that ultrametric spaces are not 
adequate models for syntactic workspaces; as we will see shortly, the topology of the lexicon is 
another matter entirely. 
3.2 A comment on Uriagereka (2011) 
Another recent contribution to the topological view of syntax, Uriagereka’s (2011) system goes 
somewhat deeper into the mechanisms that relate the lexicon to the syntax, while still assuming that 
these are distinct components. We will come back to Uriagereka’s ‘kite’ model, in which phrase 
markers fold and knot in chain dependencies in Section 5 below, but some preliminary comments are 
in order, for his model of the lexicon constitutes the basis of our proposal. In Uriagereka’s (2011) 
model, phrase structural ultrametricity constitutes networks, and the lexicon itself is conceived of as a 
network of statistically weighted connections. More abstractly, a lexicon is an underlying field of 
connectivities between unobservable states, which become observable only after Spell-Out and 
externalization. In the proposals of Uriagereka (2011) and Saddy (2018), the topology of the lexical 
space is ultrametric, and thus each element of the lexicon should be connected to every other by a 
constant distance d (because of the ultrametric inequality; the same axiom that determines that every 
                                                          
6 The notion was initially proposed in Aoun & Sportiche (1983) as a revision of c-command, and it was given 
the name m-command (‘maximal command’) in Chomsky (1986: 8): 
α c-commands β iff α does not dominate β and every γ that dominates α dominates β. 
Where γ is restricted to maximal projections (following Aoun and Sportiche 1983), we will say that α m-
commands β 
13 
 
point in a sphere is the center of that sphere). In other words: the ground-state dynamics of the lexicon 
(the state of the lexical space before the application of any syntactic operation) features lexical items, 
conceived of as points in a field, configuring a topological space in which no two elements are closer 
to each other than any other two (recall condition (5e) above). In principle, we see no objection to this 
assumption; unless linguistic experience is taken into consideration, and some connections between 
items x and y are reinforced. If this happens, the ultrametricity of the lexicon would be disrupted, 
resulting in x and y closer together than, say, x and z or y and z. We will argue that the ultrametricity 
of the ground state of the lexicon is, indeed, disrupted but derivationally, in the course of building 
syntactic structure. More specifically, we contend (with Saddy, 2018) that this is precisely what 
structure building is. With reference to this point, Uriagereka (p.c.) insightfully says that 
The idea is that when you merge, say, “men” into “like arguments” (or some such), you are 
literally getting “men” to a proximity w.r.t. “arguments” that it would not otherwise have had 
(as compared to, say, “men” and “boys” or “arguments” and “discussions”, say). As a 
consequence of the merge, each of the relevant words (understood as information-density peaks 
within the space) will obtain new conditions. If the merge had never happened before in a 
speaker’s mind, the contribution of each new word would be huge. For instance, if you have 
just heard for the first time “men like arguments”, then you will learn that “men are such that 
they like arguments” or that “arguments are the sorts of relations that men engage in”. When 
the merger has occurred already (enough to take the relevant specificity to be present in a 
subject’s mind), the new association will strengthen the salience of given properties. 
The model sketched in this passage is not unlike connectionist approaches to lexical networks, and it 
is likely such a proposal can be implemented in a connectionist network (Thomas, 1997; also Dell, 
Chang and Griffin, 1999): the model that Uriagereka proposes allows for the adjustment of activation 
weights, such that the relevant field is not only dynamic, but capable of ‘learning’. Now, it is crucial 
to note here that if in establishing a syntactic dependency between men and arguments we are getting 
them closer together than they would be in the lexicon; that means that an ultrametric approach to the 
phrase marker corresponding to men like arguments is not quite compatible with the claim that the 
lexicon is ultrametric. After all, if paradigmatic oppositions define ultrametric spaces, syntagmatic 
relations are based on metricity: like needs to be closer to arguments than men is; but only in the 
context of the sentence men like arguments. In sum: ultrametricity seems to be a good candidate to 
model the topology of the ground state of the lexicon, but not that of structural descriptions of specific 
natural language strings. In the following section we will explore why.  
4. Why ultrametricity? 
The previous section, while objecting to an ultrametric view of syntactic structure, introduced the 
proposal that the ground state dynamics of the lexicon is best formalized as an ultrametric space. 
Furthermore, we can make the hypothesis stronger by adding the condition that the ultrametric space 
be completely Hausdorff (recall, this means that distinct points have disjoint closed neighbourhoods). 
The distinction between closed and open neighbourhoods is essential, since bringing points closer 
together by means of operations over the space can make these points’ neighbourhoods intersect if 
these are open. Metric spaces are typically Hausdorff, but not necessarily completely Hausdorff. This 
caveat will be crucial for our conception of what syntax does to the ground state dynamics of the 
lexical field.  
In this scenario, a question immediately arises: why not adopt a metric space to describe the 
ground state dynamics of the lexicon? (recall that we defined metric space in (4) above). We will 
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argue in the following sections that, although metricity is not an inherent property of the conceptual or 
phonotactic spaces for reasons of accessibility, among other things, ‘syntax’ is best described as a 
topological operation that dynamically introduces a metric function between perturbations on an 
otherwise ultrametric field. The linguistic workspace (the ‘workspace’ in the recent definitions of 
Merge) is, we argue, a metric space7. This perspective entails, of course, that we do not conceive of 
‘syntax’ as a set of generative rules.  
Uriagereka (2012), Krivochen (2018a), and Saddy (2018) introduced the concept of 
dynamical frustration, the optimal resolution of the clash between opposing requirements, as a crucial 
aspect of the architecture of language in cognition (we need to note, however, that the idea of a 
tension between mutually incompatible tendencies in language appears, however, already in Tesnière, 
1959: 218). The idea was that morphophonology and semantics impose orthogonal requirements over 
syntactic representations, with ‘flatness’ and linearity on the phonological side (essentially a 
Saussurean requirement; see also Scheer, 2013; Idsardi & Raimy, 2013) and multidimensionality and 
higher-level relations in the semantic side (see Hinzen, 2009: 31 for a Minimalist perspective on 
‘multi-dimensional thought’ and how the computational system ‘boosts the dimensionality of the 
human mind’; also Mori, 2005; Uriagereka, 2008: Chapter 6). The concept of dynamical frustration 
appeared in the context of the study of spin glasses, which are ‘disordered’ magnets, lattices in which 
electrons are subject to a pairwise antialignment constraint, which makes the system locally frustrated 
(since an electron has to be changing spin permanently in order to maintain the antialignment with its 
neighbours). As Rammal et al. (1986: 771, ff.) argue, ‘The crucial ingredients in these models [of spin 
glasses] are disorder and frustration.’ Disorder is understood in its usual ‘entropy’ sense -see 
Caracciolo and Radicatti (1989) for discussion about the entropy of ultrametric dynamical systems-. 
Since the system as a whole cannot achieve a stable state, instead, multiple locally optimal solutions 
are found by actants in the dynamical system. If, as argued in Uriagereka (2012: Chapter 7); Saddy 
(2018), and Krivochen (2018a) (based on Tesnière, 1959), the computational properties of ‘natural 
language’ are the result of a dynamical frustration between global and local tendencies (corresponding 
to semantic and morpho-phonological requirements, respectively), it makes sense to think that such a 
frustration can give rise to an ultrametric space which is progressively transformed (metrized) by 
means of syntactic operations whereby the atoms of syntactic structure (lexical items, sub-lexical 
primitives, depending on the level of granularity preferred by the reader) are related.  
                                                          
7 For instance, Zwarts and Gärdenfors’ (2015) analysis of locative and directional prepositions in terms of 
relations between NPs within a polar coordinates system can be read as an argument for the metricity of the 
linguistic space, since the notion of ‘(polar) betweenness’ that is essential for their argument crucially requires 
points to be related by a variable distance relation. Even if their argument for polar coordinates was rejected, 
Cartesian ‘betweenness’ also rests on metricity as a ground assumption. In a non-metric space –either 
ultrametric or pseudometric-, there is no way of formulating ‘betweenness’, for all points are equidistant.  
8  1. — The possibility of a term in the structural order having, beyond its unique higher connection, two or 
three lower connections […] collides, in its place in a sentence, with the impossibility of a word in the 
spoken string being immediately in a sequence with more than two adjacent words […] In other words, 
every structural node is susceptible to the creation of bifurcations, trifurcations, etc…, that are 
incompatible with linear order. 
3. — There is thus a tension between the structural order, which has several dimensions […], and the 
linear order, which has one dimension. This tension is the squaring the circle of language. Its resolution 
is the sine qua non condition of speech. 
4. — The tension between the structural order and the linear order can only be resolved by sacrificing at 
least one linear sequence at the point of placement in the sentence. (Tesnière, 1959: 21. Translation: 
Susan F. Schmerling. Highlighting ours). 
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This process is much better captured if we do not assume from the beginning that the 
topology of the syntactic workspace is static and immutable. In this context, Saddy (2018) argues that 
the ground state of neurocognitive dynamics is an ultrametric space which is not only high-
dimensional but also unrestricted, lacking hard conditions. Given such a space, there will be an 
infinite number of n-dimensional manifolds which, provided the topology of the space is disrupted – 
as from external input - they may intersect. In other words, for while in an ultrametric space the 
distance function d between a point x ∈ X and a point y ∈ Y (for X and Y manifolds) is fixed and > 0, 
the intersection of X and Y at x, y means that d(x, y) = 0. Interpretation can only occur in a metric 
space bounded by hard conditions over usable outputs, since –as we saw in Uriagereka’s quotation- 
linguistic elements are closer to those they are to be interpreted in relation to (trajectors and 
landmarks, in the terms of Zwarts and Gärdenfors, 2015: 10)9. The idea that the representational space 
is a Hilbert metric space and structures are essentially defined in vector fields is also a core 
assumption of Gradient Symbolic Computation (Smolensky et al., 2014), however, GSC does not 
implement a computationally mixed engine nor does it deal with varying metrics; the programs are 
potentially compatible, yet not equivalent. In the case of adverbials and prepositional constructions in 
natural language, the possibility of having intensifiers (‘very close’) and comparatives (‘farther 
away’) which locate elements in relative terms to one another and to landmarks calls for a variable 
metric function over a Euclidean space rather than for ultrametricity (e.g., Zwarts’, 2003 proposal 
using polar coordinates). In this sense, relating elements qua field perturbations is simply making 
them interfere: such interference does not take place if the topology of the field is untouched, because 
the ground state is a weakly associative, ultrametric field. This conception of syntactic derivations, in 
terms of oscillatory dynamics, will be expanded on below.  
5. What is, then, ‘syntax’? 
So far we have a characterization of the workspace where syntactic operations apply and, in that 
space, we have the elements that appear in structural descriptions defined as points or sets thereof 
within said space: in this context, elements within the workspace (which, again, are defined as sets of 
points) are related when the topology of the space is perturbed, and elements are drawn closer 
together. This perturbation of an initially ultrametric space disrupts said ultrametricity, yielding a 
metric space (Saddy, 2018). The question now is, what is the role of syntax in this process? In this 
context, consider the following condition on a strongly cyclic syntax, from Uriagereka (2012: 75):  
Whenever a phrase-marker K is divided into complex sub-components L and M […], the 
daughter phrase-marker M that spells-out separately must correspond to an identical term M 
within K. 
                                                          
9 Consider, for instance, the formalization of the meaning of the prepositions ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in terms of 
polar coordinates (Zwarts and Gärdenfors, 2015: 11), for x = distance between a trajector (a.k.a. figure, see 
Zwarts, 2003) and the space of a landmark (a.k.a., ground) S(L); θ = angle between the trajector and the x-axis; 
ϕ = angle between the trajector and the positive z-axis; and rL is the radius of the landmark L: 
inside(L) = {⟨x, θ, ϕ⟩ ∈ S(L) : x ≤ rL} 
outside(L) = {⟨x, θ, ϕ⟩ ∈ S(L) : x > rL} 
Since landmarks are assumed to be circles in this work, if the linguistic space (as opposed to the ground state of 
cognitive dynamics) was ultrametric, then every point would be at a distance x = r, neither inside nor outside 
S(L), or, rather, if x = 0, every point would be the origo. The semantics of prepositions (and, more generally, 
localist theories of cognition) thus requires metricity. 
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Uriagereka gives us here a way to solve the problem with which all models of structure interpretation 
(be it narrowly syntactic or much more general cognitive mechanisms, see e.g. Rabinovich et al., 
2014; also Feigenson, 2011 for a flexible approach to chunking and grouping): once an input has been 
chunked and each part has been subject to an arbitrary set of operations, how to we put everything 
back together? From a generative-derivational viewpoint, in which structure is built step-by-step by 
means of discrete recursive combinatorics (e.g., the operation Merge), the question can be phrased as: 
how can separate command units (local monotonically derived phrase markers) be linked? The 
problem, when asked specifically about linguistic structures, pertains to the relation between strict 
locality and compositionality, but given the ubiquity of chunking operations in cognition, it is much 
more general. What we want to do is provide a way to capture compositionality in both local and 
long-distance dependencies without having to invoke additional structure in the form of non-terminal 
nodes (see also Lasnik, 2011; Lasnik & Uriagereka, 2012; Krivochen, 2015 for further discussion on 
the issue of ‘too much structure’ that arises in transformationally enriched PSG). In local domains 
within a single derivational space things seem to be rather straightforward, because (i) either there is 
no need to chunk, or (ii) if there is, then compositionality can proceed after applying the simple 
generalized transformation substitution (Chomsky, 1955; Joshi & Kroch, 1985). In traditional phrase 
structure terms, let K be a term, and let M be a term within K, with a node L in its frontier. 
Furthermore, let L be a distinct term (not a part of K). Then, we can substitute the node L in M with 
the sub-tree (term) L: 
11)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
We have been deliberately obscure with respect to which L we are referring to in each instance, the 
reason being that substitution works if and only if L ∈ M is identical to the root of the separate term L 
(see Frank, 2002: 17, ff. for discussion). This is a simple case, which can correspond to clausal 
complementation (see Bresnan, 1971 for an early treatment of clausal complementation in terms very 
similar to these): 
12) John wished [that Mary would go out with him] 
(12) contains two clausal domains in a hypotactic relation: the clause between square brackets, call it 
L, is subordinated to the verb wish (whose VP we shall call M), which in turn is indirectly dominated 
by the root of the tree corresponding to John wished. Let’s call that root K. Then, a derivation of (12) 
using cyclic substitution goes along the following lines: 
13) a. [K John [M wished [L]]] 
b. [L that Mary would go out with him] 
c. [K John [M wished [L that Mary would go out with him]]] (via substitution targeting L) 
But even in this case there is a problem: how do we get the relation John-him to hold? In a phrase 
structure grammar it is necessary to invoke additional devices (e.g., indexing, plus a level of 
L K 
M 
L 
Substitute L ∈ M by L 
K 
M 
L 
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representation where indices are identified and interpreted) which allows the grammar to identify 
John and him as NPs which share denotation. If we do not pay attention to their phonological form 
(John vs. him), then we can simply use Δ (as in Fiengo, 1977; Krivochen, 2018a) to denote the sortal 
variable that corresponds to the interpretation10 of the NP. Then, we actually have 
14) a. [K Δ [M wished [L]]] 
b. [L that Mary would go out with Δ] 
Once L substitutes for L ∈ M, we simply have a single instance of Δ in two distinct syntactic 
contexts: if roots are addresses which point towards concepts, we simply have a single address 
repeated twice. Identity is not defined in terms of indexes or external elements added to the 
representation, but simply in terms of where the addresses point towards. Now, note that identifying a 
single sortal variable in two contexts generates a torus of sorts: the phrase marker can fold and the 
ends (the Δs) can collapse into a single element (see also Martin & Uriagereka, 2014, to which we 
will return below). It is crucial to note that, if syntactic operations are required to yield tree-like 
structures in which an element cannot be dominated by more than a single node (the so-called Single-
Mother Condition; Sampson, 1975) then we are required to multiply the entities in the structural 
description: because syntactic context is defined in terms of dominance (and possibly also precedence; 
see McCawley, 1968a), Δ dominated by K and Δ dominated by with in L already have a mother node 
and cannot have another. Topologically, the identification of Δ in K and Δ in L (which we will refer to 
as ΔK and ΔL for concreteness) amounts to having d(ΔK, ΔL) = 0.  
More interesting issues arise when we consider complex cases. For instance, the annotated examples 
in (15): 
15) a. [Which picture of himselfj]i did Johnj say Mary likes __i  (Uriagereka, 2011: 5, ex. 11) 
b. Johni wondered [which picture of himselfi/j]k Billj saw __k (Chomsky, 1995: 205, ex. 36 a) 
Note that a simple ‘end-to-end’ gluing (which could work for (12)) cannot work here, because there 
are elements in the middle of the string which need to be identified with Δ variables embedded in 
wider syntactic environments. Let us unpack this: we shall use primes to distinguish denotata, such 
that, for instance, Δ will denote the interpretation of the sortal entity John (regardless of the morpho-
phonological exponent that the corresponding NP receives in distinct syntactic contexts), and Δ’ will 
denote the interpretation of the sortal entity Mary, mutatis mutandis.  
In this context, let us consider the structure of (15a), indicating only the variables that correspond to 
John and Mary, for simplicity: 
16) [Which picture of Δ] did Δ say Δ’ likes 
But this cannot be right, because there is a ‘gap’ licensed by the transitive verb like. Regardless of 
how we represent this (see Sag, 2010), there has to be a way to indicate that the term [which picture of 
Δ] satisfies the valency of like, but it also receives an operator interpretation: 
17) For which x, x a picture of John, John said Mary likes x 
The same procedure as in (12), substitution at the periphery, would not work. The reason is that we 
need the structural description not only to fold, but also to self-intersect: there is a Δ in the subject 
                                                          
10 This interpretation can be defined, as we did in Krivochen (2018b), as the translation of the NP into 
intensional logic (Montague, 1973). For reasons of space and scope we will not go deeper into this here.  
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position of the matrix clause, and a Δ within the operator complex [which picture of Δ]. Furthermore, 
this operator complex also appears in two contexts, as evidenced informally in (16). How would this 
be solved in a transformational, combinatory-based syntax? By multiplying the nodes and 
incorporating a notion of indexing that takes care of identification whenever relevant:   
18) [Which picture of himselfj]i did Johnj say Mary likes ti   
The derivation of (18) along classical lines requires, at least, the following: 
 A set of phrase structure rules to generate the string John said Mary likes which picture of 
himself (we will not deal with the problem of whether John and himself are transformationally 
related à la Lees & Klima, 1963 now, but we will very shortly) 
 A movement rule that displaces the syntactic term [which picture of himself] from its base 
position as the complement of like to the ‘left periphery’, call it Wh-movement (Chomsky & 
Lasnik, 1977: 434) 
 An indexing rule that keeps track of occurrences of syntactic terms. It needs to be able to 
assign the same index to John and himself, but also to which picture of himself and t. 
 A rule that inserts the auxiliary do to spell-out tense and agreement features 
Interestingly, much of this complication emerges because interrogatives are assumed to derive from 
declaratives (in other words, declaratives are assumed to be more basic than interrogatives). But what 
happens if we take interrogatives and declaratives as equally ‘basic’ structures, and only care about 
providing a map of dependencies in terms of distance? In that case, we can summarize what we need 
to capture: 
 John and himself denote the same sortal entity 
 The syntactic object Which picture of himself occurs11 in two syntactic contexts 
In other words: 
19) d(John, himself) = 0  
But we know that (19) can only be the case if John = himself by (8b), which is equivalent to saying 
that John and himself have the same ‘referential index’. So we do not need to incorporate any 
additional terminal node or indexing mechanism (or reconstruction procedure), provided that we have 
the dependency in (19) and the identity property holds for the space where the dependency in (19) 
holds (see (4b), (5b)).  
                                                          
11 The notion of ‘occurrence’ used in the context of Chomskyan Minimalism is far from clear. The terms 
‘occurrence’, ‘copies’, ‘repetitions’ have been used in a transformational framework (Collins & Groat, 2018; 
Chomsky, 1995, 2017), but they correspond to intra-theoretical entities which depend on there being copying 
and chopping transformations (in the sense of Ross, 1967) and an indexing mechanism over elements in a 
Numeration and in the derivation. Many of the problems identified in Collins & Groat (2018); Collins & Stabler 
(2016); Chomsky (2017) arise because derivations operate over sets of lexical items and sets of sets of lexical 
items, with workspaces being defined over these (Collins & Stabler, 2016: Definition 10). Chomsky (2013: 40) 
uses copies and repetitions as types of occurrences, without defining any of these terms. In (2000: 115) he says 
that ‘an occurrence of α in K to be the full context of α in K.’, where K is a syntactic object. Presumably, the 
‘context’ refers to the mother-daughter nodes of α. There is a confusion, we think, between phrase markers as 
sets and diagrams of phrase markers (trees) (see also Postal, 2010: 7; McCawley, 1998: 47-48).  
The approach adopted here is diametrically opposite to the generative one: we are concerned with workspaces as 
topological spaces; these are indeed sets of points but we are concerned about the distance function between 
points in these spaces.  
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The case of which picture of himself is simpler, insofar as we can simply make use of the same ‘end-
to-end gluing’ mechanism we suggested before (which was originally proposed in Martin & 
Uriagereka, 2014: 176). The interesting thing here is that we have three things going on: 
20) a. The metrization of the initially ultrametric lexical field as dependencies are created between 
lexical items in syntagmatic relations, creating a bounded metric space, 
b. The space folding and its boundaries (the right and left peripheries) meeting, and 
c. The space self-intersecting in order to yield the multiplicity of syntactic contexts in which 
the variable that denotes the sortal entity John appears: as the subject of the matrix clause, as 
the term of the preposition of within the operator complex of which in the rightmost edge, and 
as the term of of in the same operator complex in the leftmost edge of the space; needless to 
say, these two collapse into one in step (b), and then again collapse with John in this step 
So in the end what we have is a self-intersecting oriented topological structure defined in metric 
space: we have nodes which correspond to (Intensional Logic translations of) basic expressions of the 
language and which are connected; these connections are represented by edges between those nodes 
which encode the distance that separates any given nodes within a space. Note that the process of 
metrization we assume here only needs one space, because (unlike Y-model based architectures of the 
grammar) there is no separation between a lexicon component and a syntactic component: ‘syntax’ is 
something that ‘happens to the lexicon’, informally put (see Stroik & Putnam, 2013; also McCawley, 
1968b and much related work in Generative Semantics). Also, it is important to point out that the 
operations do not extend the space, if anything, the portion of the lexical space that we care about gets 
literally smaller as points are drawn closer together (consequently, there is nothing like the Minimalist 
Extension Condition applying here).  
At this point, it is interesting to observe that given the present assumptions, the complexity of 
phrase markers can be determined in topological terms: whether they require folding or not (in the 
sense of Martin & Uriagereka, 2014: 175-176); if they do, whether there is self-intersection, and if 
there is, how many instances of it. For example: 
21) a. Mary was reading a book → no folding 
b. John despises himself → end-to-end gluing (unknot) 
c. Which picture of himself did John say Mary likes? → end-to-end gluing + 1 self-
intersection at Δ = John 
d. The man who shows he deserves it will get the prize he desires → 3 self-intersections at Δ 
= man + 3 self-intersections at Δ’ = prize 
There are some aspects of (21d), an example of so-called Bach-Peters paradoxes (Bach, 1970; 
Karttunen, 1971), that deserve closer inspection. One of the reasons why Bach-Peters paradoxes bear 
a particular syntactic and semantic interest is that, under a transformational view of how pronouns 
come to be in Surface Structure, they must be assigned Deep Structures of infinite complexity, with 
infinite levels of embedding (Bach, 1970). However, pronominalization understood as the idea that 
pronouns are contextually defined NPs is only doomed by Bach’s argument if it assumed that all 
pronouns are derived the same, which apart from a priori uniformity requirements12. Thus, it is 
                                                          
12 In this respect, Postal (1969: 203) correctly points out that  
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possible to keep the original insights of the transformational approach (Lees & Klima, 1963; Ross, 
1969) by restricting its applicability to specific contexts (e.g., pronouns in root clauses need not be 
transformationally derived, as argued by Lakoff, 1976: 329, ff. and Postal, 1969, among others). One 
of the advantages of the framework we have sketched here is that in order to capture the insights of 
pronominalization we need not make reference to two nodes (as in the Lees-Klima version), but only 
to one which is ordered with respect to nodes in two distinct contexts. Consider in this sense Collins 
& Stabler’s (2016: 51) definition of position: 
The position of SOn in SO1 is a path, a sequence of syntactic objects 〈SO1,SO2, ..., SOn〉 where 
for all 0 < i < n, SOi + 1 ∈ SOi. 
The word path is crucial here, and we need to define it in order to have a proper comparison between 
the view of phrase structure that follows from the formalization of minimalist syntax in Collins & 
Stabler (2016) and the kind of system argued for here. Let v1 and v2 be two (not necessarily distinct) 
vertices in a graph G: a v1-v2 walk in G is a finite ordered alternating sequence of adjacent vertices and 
edges that begins in v1 and ends in v2. A path is a walk in which no vertices are repeated, whereas a 
trail is a walk in which no edges are repeated, but vertices can be (Gould, 1988: 9; Wilson, 1996: 26; 
Van Steen, 2010: 37). Requiring of phrase markers that there be unambiguous paths necessarily 
multiplies the nodes, whereas weakening the requirement to trails allows for the same node to be 
visited more than once: in both cases we have an ordered set of nodes and edges, but the 
consequences of adopting paths or trails are far-reaching. If paths are adopted (as in Kayne, 1984 and 
much subsequent work), then extra structure and indexing mechanisms are unavoidable. If instead we 
settle for trails in directed graphs which correspond to structural descriptions, where vertices are 
syntactic objects and edges encode the distance between these objects, we can do away with intra-
theoretical devices such as indices, traces, copies, repetitions, etc. 
In the approach proposed here, the syntactic objects the man, who, and he in (21d) point to the 
same point in the lexical field, because that perturbation in the lexical field corresponds, as argued in 
detail in Krivochen (2018b), to a translation of the indexed basic expression in that node into 
intensional logic (in the sense of Montague, 1973; Partee, 1975). This means that John and himself in 
(19) and who, the man, he correspond to the same point in the space, which is visited more than once 
in a walk through the workspace. Taking a snapshot of the metrization process results in a map of 
points and trails, because the structures built by the metrization of the ultrametric lexicon are 
orientable manifolds (Saddy, 2018). In this context we can consider the detailed description of these 
maps (which are technically graphs) in Krivochen (2018b) based essentially on the following notion 
of dominance: 
Let ρ be a binary relation ‘immediately dominates’. Let ρ* be a binary relation ‘transitively 
dominates’, where v1 [a vertex in the graph, which corresponds to a basic expression of the 
language in the sense of Montague, 1973; Schmerling, in press] dominates v2 iff there is some 
e <v1, v2> (i.e., there is a directed edge from v1 to v2) (Krivochen, 2018b: 15; see also 
McCawley, 1968a: 244-245) 
Orientability in one of these maps is based on the following definition of order: 
                                                          
…it makes no sense to ask such traditional questions as “Is such and such occurrence of form F a 
noun?” It only makes sense to ask such questions contextually with respect to a specified structure 
(highlighted in the original). 
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A vertex v1 is ordered with respect to v2 iff either ρ(v1, v2) or ρ(v2, v1) or ρ*(v1, v2) or ρ*(v2, 
v1). If v1 is ordered with respect to v2, either v1 is in the ρ-domain of v2 or v2 is in the ρ-domain 
of v1. (Krivochen, 2018b: 16) 
Note that this approach, incidentally, eliminates the apparent problems that emerge with copies and 
repetitions (Chomsky, 2012, 2017; Collins & Groat, 2018): if we ditch the Single Mother Condition, 
we can simply define a copy as a point or vertex that is dominated by more than one vertex 
corresponding to a predicative expression (such that the man, who, and he would be copies), and 
repetitions fall into the elsewhere case, which encompasses all disjoint reference and distinctness 
more generally. 
We can now summarize some aspects of the theoretical proposal as has been presented so far, 
which owes much to Saddy (2018) (to which we refer the reader for additional discussion). The 
ground state of cognitive dynamics is defined, we contend, as an ultrametric completely Hausdorff 
space with a strong separation axiom (specifying closed neighbourhoods), and external perturbations 
change this; ‘syntax’ is the parametrization and metrization of this space which arises from the 
dynamical frustration existing between the orthogonal planes of sound and meaning (‘expression’ and 
‘content’ in Hjelmslevian terms; see also Tesnière, 1959). Now, if ultrametric spaces are completely 
Hausdorff –that is, distinct points have closed disjoint neighborhoods- then disrupting the 
ultrametricity of a field also impacts on its completely Hausdorff characteristic, creating intersections 
between the neighborhoods of points (or the set thereof). A derivation, we claim, is the transformation 
of a completely Hausdorff space with a strong separation condition such that disjoint points have 
disjoint closed neighbourhoods into a Hausdorff space in which points have disjoint open 
neighbourhoods which can be drawn closer together and intersect via syntactic operations which 
affect the topology of the space rather than operating as a set of combinatoric operations over 
discrete syntactic terminals. The resulting space displays topological distinguishability as well as 
metricity as one of its main characteristics (see Willard, 2004; Munkres, 2000). Saddy (2018: 323) 
explains the process as follows: 
The extension of the manifolds into metric space comes about due to the fact that the distance 
function between any point x in manifold X and any point y in manifold Y varies as the 
manifolds get closer and finally intersect. This is a state of affairs that is impossible in 
ultrametric space […], for x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, d(x, y) = k (some constant) in the ultrametric space 
[…]; but k → 0 as the space in which the manifolds exist is deformed. This is a process of 
metrization. Crucially, the metrization of the initial space is a consequence of the intersection 
of manifolds.  
There are various advantages in such a topological view: not the least of which is the possibility 
of defining the notion of ‘edge’ (or ‘periphery’) in cycles in a fully explicit way, which in turn 
pertains to problems of accessibility and intervenience in licensing relations. Note that in an 
ultrametric space, in which distances do not sum, either everything is an edge or nothing is: the notion 
of ‘edge’ becomes trivial. However, as the spaces get parametrized and manifolds are drawn closer, 
the distance function imposed over the initially ultrametric space (which in turn bought us topological 
distinguishability plus no inherent selectional bias) ceases to be constant. This means that in a metric 
manifold we can consider any point x, and there will be points y, z, … in the neighbourhood of x, and 
others which do not belong to the closed neighbourhood of x but are close to it: 
If S is a subset of topological space X then a neighbourhood of S is a set V that includes an 
open set U containing S. It follows that a set V is a neighbourhood of S if and only if it is a 
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neighbourhood of all the points in S. Furthermore, it follows that V is a neighbourhood of S iff 
S is a subset of the interior of V. The neighbourhood of a point is just a special case of this 
definition. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neighbourhood_(mathematics))  
The boundary set of U constitutes the edge of U. Let us spell this out in some more detail. The 
boundary (we use the topological terminology at this point because edge belongs to graph theory) of a 
subset S of a topological space X is the set of points which can be approached both from S and from 
the outside of S: this captures the syntactic idea that the edge of an object S is indeed a part of S, but 
also accessible from outside S (by operations targeting that edge from another object). More precisely, 
it is the set of points in the closure of S, not belonging to the interior of S. Now, since we are dealing 
with manifolds, things change, albeit slightly: the boundary (which, again, for all syntactic purposes is 
equivalent to what we would call the edge or periphery of a syntactic object) of an n-manifold with 
boundary is an (n − 1)-manifold. This notion is intuitive enough: the boundary of a 2-manifold (e.g., a 
sheet of paper) is a 1-manifold (a line). A manifold M with boundary is a space containing both 
interior points, which constitute the set of points which are inaccessible for operations outside M; and 
boundary points, which can be targeted from outside M (see Willard, 2004 for a much more technical 
discussion of the topological details; also Joshi, 1985 to see the importance of the boundary or edge in 
defining the operation adjunction in TAGs; Schmerling, in press for an argumentation of the crucial 
place of peripheries in the formulation of formal rules for phonological processes in a modified 
Montagovian framework). Crucially, every topological manifold is a manifold with a boundary, so the 
notion of edge, which is crucial for linguistic theories of locality, does not require any ad hoc 
stipulation. We do, however, require the relevant space to be metric in order to define edge, which 
casts further doubts about the plausibility of an ultrametric approach to phrase structure as in Roberts 
(2015) and Uriagereka (2011) (as opposed to ultrametricity as the mathematical model of the ground 
state dynamics of the derivational space, which is what we argue for here). The central place that an 
appropriate notion of edge or periphery has in syntactic theory has been argued for from different 
viewpoints. Stroik & Putnam (2013) present an interesting perspective on what the search for edges 
means for processing: 
Boeckx [2008 Bare syntax. Oxford University Press] maintains that for SDs [structural 
descriptions] to be built efficiently “syntax must provide unambiguous instructions” for 
combining syntactic objects, and he proposes that these instructions must allow syntactic 
objects to be readily identified for processing, which requires that “the extremities [edges] of 
syntactic objects must be clearly demarcated, and must be quickly reachable, by which I mean 
that once the beginning of a syntactic object is reached, its end should be nearby” […] The 
challenge that Boeckx puts before us is to maximize the speed with which the edges of SDs can 
be determined – that is, to reduce as much as possible the search for these edges. (Stroik & 
Putnam, 2013: 28) 
The question is, then, how to determine the edges of syntactic objects and restrict the kinds of 
operations that can apply to them. A phrase structure grammar can only define ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ 
if additional assumptions are added: in X-bar theory, endocentricity was defined axiomatically, and 
the early Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995: 178) defined the notions of internal domain and 
checking domain (basically, the complement and specifier(s)) assuming the notion of head. More 
recent Minimalist works (Chomsky, 2008, 2010, 2013) have encoded the concept of ‘edge’ of a 
syntactic object in features, such that syntactic objects manipulated by Merge are endowed with an 
Edge Feature that allows for recursive, unbound structure generation at the periphery of a phrase 
marker. Stroik & Putnam (2013) also appeal to feature structures, although in a different sense: 
feature matrices are hierarchically organized, and it is this hierarchy that determines the order in 
23 
 
which lexical items will be manipulated by the computational system, being copied from the 
Numeration or from the Derivation. In the present proposal, we need not restrict the discussion to 
‘heads’ or make reference to the internal structure of syntactic objects in terms of ordered features: we 
do, however, need to define what we are identifying the edge (boundary set) of: not a phrase, but 
rather a topological structure. 
6. Knots and chains in Minimalism and biolinguistics 
Given the fact that we have claimed that referential variables which point to the same 
perturbation in the lexical field are to be identified at the semantic component, how far are we from 
the (topologically inspired) ‘chain collapse’ theory of Martin and Uriagereka (2014: 180); Uriagereka 
(2008: 270; 2011)? Recall that, under transformational assumptions, a chain CH is  
a pair of positions […], (K, L) [for K, L terms] of a constituent α in a phrase marker Σ, where a 
position is taken to be a co-constituent (“sister”) of α in Σ. Thus a chain is a set of phrase 
markers denoting the positions in which some element α occurs, in some sense, simultaneously 
[i.e., at both K and L]. (Martin and Uriagereka, 2014: 169) 
What, in our opinion, is the most explicit formulation of the ‘chain collapse’ theory is given by 
Uriagereka (2011: 13): 
Chains are best represented as being comprised of several simultaneous derivational stages, so 
that in principle they exist in one or the other stage (say, the ‘foot’ or the ‘head’ of the chain, in 
these instances). To interpret a chain in a particular chain-state ρ is to collapse the chain in ρ. 
(bolds in the original) 
This extract makes explicit what happens (leaving aside problems pertaining to the requirement of 
simultaneity), but, why? For Martin and Uriagereka, the answer has to do with intentionality: 
In order to yield the command relations that determine intentionality, chains must collapse into 
unique positions (Martin and Uriagereka, 2014: 180) 
We assume that the sensory-motor interface is essentially the same [as the conceptual system] 
in that it interprets chains, which collapse into a unique determinate configuration, yielding the 
unambiguous command relations that arguably play a crucial role in determining linear order. 
(Op. Cit., fn. 28) 
Martin and Uriagereka assume that a chain has many possible outcomes, and the computational 
system has access to all of them simultaneously within domains (qua phases). Their idea is not too far 
from ours in at least one respect: chains are (related to) sets of specified coordinates in the syntactic 
workspace (or workspaces). The differences between Martin & Uriagereka’s approach and ours arise 
with respect to how those spaces are operated on. These are more theoretical than empirical, at least in 
what pertains to the phenomena these authors have analyzed: so far, the accounts Martin and 
Uriagereka (2008, 2014) provide for the binding preferences reported by Pica and Snyder (1995) hold 
under our system as well (see Krivochen, 2018a for details). This does not preclude the possibility of 
differences in the extent to which different phenomena can or cannot be accounted for arising after the 
present approach is pursued further. 
Related to the chain collapse theory, and relevant to the arguments put forth in the present paper, 
are the proposals of Camps and Uriagereka (2006) (C&U hitherto) and Balari et al. (2011) regarding 
the cognitive relevance of Knot Theory and its relation to both language evolution and computation. 
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These arguments are worth reviewing, because they will allow us to set our theory apart from a view 
that rests on Knot Theory to account for dependencies. C&U and Balari et al’s argument has two 
parts, which are actually independent of each other (as cited by Lobina, 2012a: 70): 
a) Considering that the language faculty is underlain by a computational system that generates 
sound/meaning pairs, it ought to be possible to outline some of its computational properties.  
 
b) It is at least a possibility for some other cognitive domain of the human mind to share some of 
these very computational properties, which would be visible in specific behaviors. The 
specific behavior that engages the aforementioned C&U and Balari et al. relates to the ability 
to tie a knot. 
Point (a) is one of the basic assumptions of the present work as well (see also Culicover and 
Jackendoff, 2005 for a different take on the same thesis), even if the ways in which we can implement 
it vary: while we, following Saddy (2018) and Krivochen (2018a) appeal to basic physical principles 
and derive emergent properties from the interaction between different systems and the possible 
solutions to the dynamical frustrations generated in such interactions; C&U (pp. 40-45) and Balari et 
al. (p. 10) appeal to the alleged linguistic specificity of the sound/meaning relating system (the 
Computational Component in mainstream Generative Grammar) to get to understand its properties (of 
both the specificity and the system), and assume we can study the mathematical structure of fossil 
records to reconstruct the context-sensitive operation that generated such objects (understood as 
‘derivational history’, not quite in the line of traditional computer science and automata theory13). Of 
course, we assume no such specificity, arguing instead that structure building computations appear all 
throughout cognitive domains, and there is no reason to propose a ‘parasitic’ thesis relating language 
and other cognitive domains (which is very much present in Chomskyan rhetoric, e.g., 2009: 26, 
where the number system is ‘an abstraction from language’ [i.e., Merge]; 2007: 7 for the same claim; 
see also 2005: 3, which introduces the idea of ‘social development’ having syntax as a ‘prerequisite’). 
The first part of point (b) is actually not so problematic (since, depending on how narrow the reader’s 
definition of ‘syntax’ is, we can refer to music, mathematics, vision and spatial navigation, conceptual 
structures and action, among other symbolic structures, as ‘having a syntax’), it is the link with knot 
tying that is most problematic. We will not review Lobina’s critiques here concerning the evolutionary 
scenario presented by C&U and Balari et al. (critiques with which we do agree) because evolution is 
outside the scope of this paper, but will evaluate the applicability of knot theory to syntactic theory, 
paying special attention to the notion of chain and chain collapse. 
Some definitions are in order, so as to better understand the scope of the discussion. In 
mathematics, a knot is an embedding of a 1-dimensional circle (called ‘the unknot’) in 3-dimensional 
Euclidean space, which is subjected to specific kinds of deformations (see Lickorish, 1997; Cromwell, 
2004 for definitions and introductory discussion). Mathematical knots are not subject to physical 
notions like friction or limits to their stretching and folding capabilities (as is common in topology, 
thus we can topologically transform a 1-torus into a cup because they have the same number of holes): 
the only requirement is that transformations over the unknot, which are of a very specific and limited 
kind, cannot create self-intersections; crossings are however allowed because the integrity of the 
material is not compromised (thus we can untie any well-formed knot into the unknot). C&U (p. 63) 
argue that knots are built and described by a context free system, yet they offer no evidence for this 
                                                          
13 We are not saying both formulations are contradictory, or even incompatible…we just point out that neither 
C&U nor Balari et al. offer proof that there is an equivalence between a representational approach (i.e., one 
referring to the form of the rules) and a derivational approach to context sensitivity. 
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position (rather, they refer the reader to Mount, 1989). This claim is not free of problems. To begin 
with, Lobina correctly points out that 
there is a leap from the expressive power of a language [its ‘strong generative capacity’] to the 
computational complexity of processing it [which pertains to recognition]; whilst these two 
factors are closely related, they should not be conflated (2012a: 71) 
The perils of such conflation have been already discussed in the literature on formal language theory 
(the difference between a ‘recognition point of view’ and a ‘generative point of view’ is already there 
in Hopcroft and Ullman’s classic 1969 textbook). However, while the strong and weak generative 
power of Chomsky-normal grammars and the correct generative power that is required to provide 
adequate structural descriptions for natural language strings has been object of much study (see, e.g., 
Joshi, 1985; Watumull, 2012; Kornai, 1985 for a healthy variety of perspectives) there is no 
unanimous agreement with respect to the kind of computational problems to which knot theory 
belongs: is knot recognition P complete? (see Lackenby, 2017 for recent discussion and references). 
Can a knot of arbitrary complexity be generated in PSPACE and checked in NPSPACE? Lackenby 
(2015) proposes a polynomial upper bound such that, given a knot with c crossings, it can be reduced 
to a trivial knot by using at most (236 c)11 Reidmeister moves (R-moves henceforth; see also 
Lackenby, 2013 for a more introductory perspective), which are a very restricted set of topological 
transformations over knots which can be applied recursively to yield complicated twisted patterns. 
The R-moves are operations at the very core of knot theory. Each move operates on a small region of 
the knot diagram, and is of one of three types: 
22) I: Twist and untwist in either direction. 
II: Move one loop completely over another. 
III: Move a string completely over or under a crossing. 
No other part of the diagram is involved in the picture of a move, thus they are referred to as local 
moves on a link diagram (Lickorish, 1997). All moves respect the constraint over self-intersections, 
thus we get crossings (as in Types I and II), but the possibilities are restricted. Also, all moves are 
reversible, meaning they can apply to either tangle or untangle. n knots are said to be equivalent if and 
only if they can be transformed into each other via the application of a finite number of R-moves (see, 
e.g. Lickorish, 1997: 3), exemplified below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theorem proven by Lackenby is not completely disconnected from the proposal made by 
C&U: if the strong generative power of natural language grammars is (mildly) context sensitive 
The Reidmeister moves 
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(Joshi, 1985: 221, ff.), which would make the corresponding automaton a PDA+ (a claim that 
Uriagereka, 2008: Chapter 8; 2012: 231 makes, following the seminal proposal in Joshi, 1985, and 
which Lobina, 2012a seems to think is correct), the limitations over the recognition of strings by an 
LBA (which corresponds to context-sensitive languages) should apply to knot recognition as well; 
and, if C&U’s hypothesis is correct, this should also extend to recognition of natural language strings 
by an automaton (not necessarily a human). Furthermore, if the Chomsky Hierarchy is taken at face 
value, there are consequences for the choice of an appropriate formal language to capture structural 
dependencies in natural languages. Implications for grammar and parsing are rather far-reaching. 
However, Kuroda (1964: 220) famously presented a problem known as the ‘First LBA problem’, 
essentially summarized as follows: 
23) Is NDSPACE(O(n)) = DSPACE(O(n)) for an LBA? 
The LBA problem asks whether there is some kind of equivalence between deterministic (DSPACE) 
and nondeterministic (NDSPACE) LBAs with respect to the languages they can recognize in 
polynomial time (this problem is still unsolved). This means that, even if a subset of natural language 
strings are effectively mildly context-sensitive, this does not entail that (a) the computational 
complexity of any and all natural language sub-string(s) is/are in fact Context Sensitive (or Context 
Free+, allowing crossing dependencies at local levels), or (b) that the mechanism underlying 
generation and/or recognition of knots is computationally uniform and is the same as that underlying 
language. These two points need to be argued for independently, and ultimately, because we are 
dealing with syntactic structure, the question is eminently empirical.  
The degree of applicability of the CH and the formal procedures it encompasses to natural 
languages are far from clear, and some, among whom we find ourselves, consider that it should be 
altogether abandoned for the purposes of studying natural languages and their formal properties as 
dynamical, analogic systems (see point (a) above; we have discussed this issue in detail in Krivochen, 
2015, 2016, 2018a). In a less extreme way, Lasnik and Uriagereka (2012: 42) share this concern: 
It is an interesting empirical question whether, in I-language terms, a ‘more inclusive’ 
description entails abandoning a ‘less inclusive’ one, when the meaning of ‘inclusiveness’ is 
less obvious in terms of a generative procedure.  
To that empirical question, we have answered ‘no’ in previous works: the computational complexity 
of natural language sentences is not uniform, but rather oscillates between levels in the CH in local 
domains. In the terms used here, consider for instance the different structures in (21), above: the most 
complex case, which we repeat here for the reader’s convenience: 
24) The man who shows he deserves it will get the prize he desires 
Above we observed that there were 3 self-intersections at Δ = man and 3 self-intersections at Δ’ = 
prize. We will come back to the importance of self-intersections below, because it is one crucial point 
that casts doubt on the applicability of knot theory for linguistic structural descriptions. Here, we just 
want to point out that the complexity of the structural description assigned to (24) is largely a matter 
of scale: very locally, we do have strictly regular dependencies, which do not require the system to go 
to Context-Free rules. For instance, consider the sub-string: 
25) …who shows he deserves it… 
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Must we push the system to CF power in order to get an appropriate structural description for the 
substring in (25)? It doesn’t look like we do. An adequate segmentation of (25), dispensing with 
inaudible structure, is (26): 
26) …[who [shows [he [deserves [it]]]]]… 
That is, the structure grows uniformly (one terminal at a time, and always branching in the same 
direction, if we visualize (26) as a tree diagram14). This monotonic growth makes (26) a good 
candidate for finite-state modelling, since: 
a given finite-state language L can be generated either by a psg [Phrase Structure Grammar] 
containing only left-linear rules: Z → aY, Z → a, or by a psg containing only right-linear rules: Z 
→ Ya, Z → a, and a psg containing either only left-linear rules or only right-linear rules will 
generate a finite state language (Greibach, 1965: 44) 
Or, in purely linguistic terms, 
An exhaustively binary phrase-marker, none of whose branches symmetrically bifurcates, can 
be expressed in FS [Finite State] fashion. (Uriagereka, 2012: 53) 
But as soon as we consider that substring in a wider syntactic context, things get more complex: the 
relative clause (26) is adjoined to an NP the man, which in turn is (all of it) the subject of will get… 
plus the referential dependencies between who, he, the man and it, the prize and the gap in the 
complement of desire. Summarizing much discussion and empirical arguments in previous works, we 
can say that assigning a CF structural description to (26) would entail introducing extra-structure in 
the form of inaudible non-terminal or ‘intermediate’ nodes just for the purposes of structural 
uniformity (all strings are made equal, based on an a priori structural template), a problem that has 
been observed since Chomsky (1963)15 and recently reformulated in Lasnik (2011); Lasnik & 
Uriagereka (2012), and Krivochen (2015, 2016). The solution we proposed in previous works relies 
on allowing the computational complexity of structural descriptions assigned to natural language 
strings vary in local domains, thus avoiding the problem of extra structure. Note that this entails that 
the answer to Lasnik & Uriagereka’s question in the quotation above is negative: an adequate 
grammar for natural languages cannot be based on subset relations between formal languages (cf. 
Chomsky, 1959: 143)16. 
6.1 Transformational folding: on (the absence of) knots in syntax 
                                                          
14 We cannot stress enough that using trees or brackets is merely a visual aid. They should have no theoretical 
entity: diagrams of L-graphs (graphs which define structural descriptions for natural language strings) must not 
be confused with L-graphs, which are mathematical objects and a full specification of which (in terms of nodes, 
edges, and distances) can be given without any visual aid. See also Postal (2010) for further discussion.  
15 The relevant quotation is the following: 
a constituent-structure grammar necessarily imposes too rich an analysis on sentences because of 
features inherent in the way P-markers [phrase markers] are defined for such sentences (Chomsky, 1963: 
298) 
16 ‘Theorem 1: for both grammars and languages, Type 0 ⊇ Type 1 ⊇ Type 2 ⊇ Type 3’ (Chomsky, 1959: 143); 
where Type 0 = unrestricted; Type 1 = Context-Sensitive; Type 2 = Context-Free; Type 3 = regular. 
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Imagine that we have a phrase marker in which objects X and Y are in a local relation, as represented 
visually in (27): 
27)  
 
 
 
Now suppose that there is some relation R between X and Y: in this case, X theta-marks Y, Y is the 
object of X. That relation needs to be maintained throughout the derivation, or reconstructed at the 
level of semantic interpretation if disrupted by a reordering or deletion rule. We have seen some 
problems with the latter option, so we would like to give some general prospects to explore the 
former. Let us now introduce a further element in the derivation, Z, which requires a local relation 
with Y in order to satisfy some requirement (which one in particular is not relevant for the present 
argument), where Z is external to {X, Y}: 
28)  
 
 
 
 
 
If we operate over the space where the relations are defined, then we can fold this space, such that we 
get the following figures, which visually represent directed graphs (sets of vertices and edges, where 
vertices are points in a workspace): 
29)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But trees can only get us so far: note that we have included intermediate nodes (or ‘non-terminals’, 
indicated with ●), which add nothing to semantic or morpho-phonological interpretation. This device 
gives brackets syntactic reality, which they should not have (being mere notational artefacts). It is 
much more convenient to think of these structural descriptions in terms of relations and arguments. 
As pointed out before, the structures we are building are orientable, which means that we can define 
an asymmetric relation ρ such that ρ(x, y) ≠ ρ(y, x) in a structural description SD. Then, we have a 
mapping f : SDj → SDj, for i < j, in which relations are preserved by ditching the requirement that 
relations be binary, which we have seen requires the multiplication of nodes. It is worth pointing out 
that we are not dealing with mappings between levels of representation to which different well-
X Y murdered John 
e.g.: 
X Y 
 ● Z 
 ● 
murdered John 
 ● be 
 ● e.g.: 
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formedness conditions apply (as was the case in GB), rather, SDi and SDj are simply two ‘snapshots’ 
of the metrization process of a topological space: they are subsequent in time provided that syntactic 
computation is modelled as a dynamical system (Saddy, 2018).  
This approach to structural changes allows us to have a definition of different ‘transformations’ in 
terms of processes that preserve relations within selected structure (known as homomorphic 
mappings17), as the process by means of which an SD in which certain relations hold comes to be 
within a workspace. For instance, in John was murdered we have: 
30) a. SDi = (murder(e, John) & (be, murdered)) ∈ ρ 
b. SDj = (murder(e, John) & (be, murdered) & (be, John)) ∈ ρ 
Then, the definition of passive is simply the mapping from SDi to SDj under the conditions specified 
for input and output, as in the Standard Theory days. But, as said above, SDi and SDj are related in 
time, not as basic and derived levels of representation: SDi does not co-exist with SDj.  
In Uriagereka’s (2011) and Martin & Uriagereka’s (2008, 2014) approach, chains collapse for 
purposes of interpretation at the interfaces. This collapse entails reducing n occurrences of a syntactic 
object to a single one, which Martin & Uriagereka refer to as ρ. Uriagereka (2011: 18) proposes that 
stepwise movement, which generates chain links, proceeds in a ‘field-like fashion’, involving cross-
derivational dependencies (i.e., dependencies across local derivational units). Let us see such an 
example: consider (15a), repeated here: 
15a)  Which picture of himself did John say Mary likes? 
Uriagereka’s (2011) cross-derivational analysis goes along the following lines: 
31)  
 
 
 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the process illustrated in (31) can be interpreted (using the theory sketched 
in the previous sections) as specifying the contexts in which a single instance of which picture appears 
within a self-intersecting manifold. Each contextual specification needs to be independently argued 
for, however, and, again, it is not clear a ‘one-size-fits-all’ movement rule yields desirable empirical 
                                                          
17 Mathematically, the interest of structure preserving transformations lies in the fact that they are 
homomorphisms. This means a map (a function) with domain A and codomain B f : A → B between two sets A, 
B equipped with the same structure such that, if * is an operation of the structure, then the following equality 
holds: 
f(x*y) = f(x)*f(y) for every pair x, y of elements of A. 
That is: whatever relation * held between x and y in A, before the application of the mapping, also holds 
between x and y in B, after the application of the mapping. 
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results (consider, for instance, Postal’s 1972 arguments in favour of unbounded Wh-movement, based 
on the lack of intermediate site reconstruction with preposition stranding). Our proposal avoids, also, 
the need to have two operations (one to create a chain and another one to collapse it) by modifying 
spaces rather than manipulating elements. Relations between points in the lexical space, in the view 
we defend in this paper, are the consequence of deforming that space, and not of combining 
lexical/syntactic units into bigger units (the ‘double-articulation’ view of language).  
The same chain collapse mechanism is assumed come into play in the case of ATB constructions 
and parasitic gaps (taken from Uriagereka, 2011: 19, ex. (40))18: 
32) a. Which cow has John milked __ [while Bill held __ ]? 
b. Which cow has [John milked __ ] and [Bill held __ ]? 
Now we need to ask whether knots can play a role in modelling chain collapse operations: if they can, 
then the same cognitive mechanisms which underlie the ability to tie and unite knots can be 
hypothesized to play a role in natural language syntax (as C&U do). In this context, we need to take a 
look at the kinds of dependencies that would be allowed in knotted phrase markers. Recall that knot 
theory allows for crossings, but the R-moves maintain the integrity of the material (thus, no self-
intersections). On the other hand, a field perspective involves identifying vectors that point to the 
same lexical perturbation in a particular syntactic context. This perspective is expressed by 
Uriagereka (2011: 19) in the form of the following principle: 
Principle of Complementarity (PC) Any observation of a chain configuration C collapses the 
chain Ch = {Cn,… Ci, … C1} that C is a link of at C’s derivational context.  
Note that this principle is just another way of saying ‘dependencies are established at the interface 
levels’, since only after a syntactic domain has been transferred to the interfaces C-I and S-M can a 
chain be ‘observed’ (the computational component is purely generative, not interpretative in 
Minimalism; it is thus ‘blind’; Chomsky, 2004 and related work). The crucial point here is, can we 
adopt a knot-theoretic perspective while maintaining the insights of a topological perspective (which 
we seem to need independently, since the computational operations need to occur somewhere)? Our 
answer is no. And the justification is simple: assume that we have a structural description involving 
referential variables which appear at the same time in distinct syntactic contexts (for example, the 
variable corresponding to the translation of John into IL appears as both object of murder and subject 
of was in John was murdered). An important caveat is to be borne in mind: it is irrelevant now to ask 
whether those tokens are involved in an ATB, parasitic gap, binding, A- or A’ movement (because the 
specifics of those configurations are epiphenomenal for the formal process of space metrization, 
regardless of their descriptive value or practical usefulness). This does not preclude a warping 
approach (as a metaphor, just like cusp catastrophes in the sense of Zeeman, 1977), but neither a field 
nor a warp mechanism for chain collapse (i.e., for identifying identical objects despite distinct 
structural contexts) are compatible with a knot theoretical approach. The relevant topological 
operations can be illustrated as follows19: 
                                                          
18 (32a) is marked ? or * by many native speakers, but we reproduce those examples as in the original 
bibliographical reference for the sake of the argument. The reader is free to replace it by an acceptable variant of 
extraction from a parasitic gap, like ‘Which paper did you file without reading?’. 
 
19 We are very grateful to Prof. María Laura Caba for kindly providing us with the drawing below, which was 
beyond our drawing possibilities. 
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Reidmeister moves and (im)possible knots 
a) 
b) 
c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we see in (b), the R-Move I applying to (a) can create a crossing (+ or -, depending on the side we 
choose, both situations have been illustrated), but –as we have insisted on- no two distinct points in 
the structure can occupy the same coordinates in space (as per (10a-b)). In contrast, collapse means 
precisely that, making different structural positions {C1, …Ci, …Cn}  reduce to a single link at a 
context C, yielding ρ (a situation graphed in (c), in which the material crosses itself, yielding an 
intersection rather than a crossing). As we see in (32), members (links) of Ch can belong to different 
derivational cascades, but there are points of intersection between those cascades, which we have 
identified with addresses pointing to the same perturbation in the lexical field. Knot theory does not 
allow such identity, with neighbourhoods for distinct points in a crossing being always disjoint in ℝ3. 
This is a crucial point, because any knot is trivially equivalent to the unknot if the curve is allowed to 
pass through itself (as in (c)), or just be untied if the loop is broken.  
Conclusions: 
The present paper contains two distinct, but related arguments.  
To begin with, in what pertains to the problem of making explicit the properties of spaces 
where syntactic operations take place (call them Merge, Copy, Transfer –from somewhere to 
somewhere else-; see Chomsky, 2017; Chomsky et al., 2017 for an orthodox take on the issue), we 
argued that syntactic derivations involve the metrization of an initially ultrametric space; and that 
structure is built when the topology of that ultrametric space is disrupted such that points within that 
space are brought closer together. Conceiving of linguistic units as addresses to points in a space 
allows us to dispense with inaudible structure that is however required by traditional phrase structure 
grammars (which operate over symbols rather than over spaces), thus simplifying representations. 
Furthermore, we eliminate the distinction between a lexical space and a syntactic space (dubbed 
‘components’ in mainstream generative grammar) by having ‘syntax’ be a set of local topological 
transformations of the lexical space. Problems related to the multiplication of workspaces in copying 
operations (External Merge as copy from the lexicon to the syntactic workspace and Internal Merge as 
copy from and to the syntactic workspace) thus do not arise. 
The second argument has to do with a specific approach to space folding, and discusses a 
proposal made in the literature (e.g., in Camps & Uriagereka 2006; Balari et al., 2011) that there are 
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computational similarities between syntactic computation and the operations underlying humans’ 
ability to work out knots. Based on the approach worked out in the first section of the paper, we 
argued that an adequate approach to long-distance dependencies in linguistic structure (including the 
notion of chain; as in Uriagereka, 2011; Martin & Uriagereka, 2014) cannot rest on knot theory (see 
Lobina, 2012a, b for a different kind of criticism of the proposal in Camps & Uriagereka, 2006 and 
Balari et al., 2011). This argument has direct consequences for the distinction between copies and 
repetitions that occupies part of the contemporary orthodox Minimalist literature (e.g., Chomsky, 
2012; particularly Collins & Groat, 2018 and references therein): difficulties only arise under a 
combinatory view of syntax in which lexicon and syntactic workspace are separated, and in which the 
‘syntax’ is modelled as discrete recursive combinatorics without properties of the workspace having 
any impact on the syntactic operations themselvees.  
It is important to point out that the claim that linguistic structure manipulation does not 
involve knot-theoretic operations does not mean that those are irrelevant for cognitive operations 
more generally; the latter have been outside the scope of the present paper. What we are saying here is 
that knot theory does not help when the system must establish a dependency involving identity 
between elements in different derivational cascades (which are crucial in a strongly cyclic, Multiple 
Spell-Out based theory). For example, when relating the instances of [which picture of himself] cross-
derivationally (as in (31), relating cascades (a), (b), and (c)), any reconstruction mechanism must 
recognize those as tokens of the same type, structurally and referentially identical: structurally, 
because they are all DPs; referentially, because they all denote the same phenomenological object (in 
other words, they are ‘coindexed’). The ‘self-intersecting’ perspective implies a simpler 
computational system than a knot-based approach to phrase markers (where by definition self-
intersection is banned), and leaves open the door for capturing the oscillatory properties of syntactic 
computation (Saddy, 2018; Krivochen, 2015, 2018a, b) in a way that knot theory does not seem to be 
able to do.  
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